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1. Introduction
The objective of reorganisation proceedings is to enable enterprises to restore their liquidity, improve their 
profi tability, and ensure their sustainable management. The Estonian Reorganisation Act*1 (RA) entered 
into force on 26 December 2008. Since there was no similar regulation in Estonia before, no widespread 
court practice can be cited; however, it is clear that for some questions the existing law does not provide 
optimal regulation. In its Submission for Approval of the Plan of Developing the Draft Act on Amending the 
Reorganisation Act*2, the Estonian Ministry of Justice has drawn attention specifi cally to the problem that 
the effectiveness of reorganisation proceedings is low. One way to bring greater effectiveness is to ensure 
protection of the rights of the debtor and creditors alike. This refers to the law having to enable compa-
nies to have the opportunity for reorganisation, if it is reasonable, and having to preclude the possibility 
of general rights of creditors not being protected against abuse by creditors with special interests. As the 
creditors have to accept the reorganisation plan, one means for reaching the objectives of reorganisation 
proceedings is division of creditors into several voting groups. The associated issue has been noted in the 
above-mentioned plan and had also been underscored earlier in the legal literature.*3
The main problem related to creditor groups is that the RA does not oblige the debtor to designate indi-
vidual creditor groups and makes no special provisions for pledgees or debtor-related persons. This means 
that the debtor is able to manipulate the votes in order to ensure the acceptance of the plan. According to 
the RA’s §24 (1), creditors shall decide on acceptance of a reorganisation plan by means of voting. Accord-
ing to §21 (2) of the RA, this reorganisation plan may prescribe that the claims of creditors shall be satisfi ed 
separately, by creditor group. Creditors with the same rights constitute one group. However, it is unclear 
what is meant by ‘the same rights’. The provisions regulating the voting process do not prescribe defi nitive 
instructions. The RA does not specify clearly which creditors should be divided into distinct groups. Nor 
does the RA even state the minimum requirements applicable in those situations in which creditors shall 
1 Saneerimisseadus. – RT I 2008, 53, 296; RT I, 21.12.2012, 1 (in Estonian).
2 Saneerimisseaduse muutmise seaduse eelnõu väljatöötamiskavatsuse esitamine kooskõlastamiseks [‘Sub mission for Approval 
of the Plan of Developing the Draft Act on Amending the Reorganisation Act’]. Available at http://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/
main#QZD0ekBD (most recently accessed on 5.1.2014) (in Estonian).
3 P. Varul. Maksejõuetuse areng Eestis [‘Developments in insolvency law in Estonia’]. – Juridica 2013/4, p. 238 (in Estonian).
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/JI.2014.21.14
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be divided into separate groups. Neither has the Supreme Court provided clear guidelines about the forma-
tion of creditor groups. In case 3-2-1-25-11, the Supreme Court stated that if creditors with various rights 
are treated signifi cantly differently in the plan, the creation of groups is compulsory.*4 However, it is still 
unclear in which cases creditor groups should be formed and in which cases the formation of groups is not 
allowed.
Consequently, under current insolvency law, the debtor has an extensive right of discretion to form 
creditor groups in such a way as to ensure the acceptance of the reorganisation plan. The formation of the 
groups is a key issue in reorganisation proceedings. However, in some cases, the formation of the groups is 
not legitimate and does not correspond to the rights and interests of at least some of the creditors. There-
fore, creditors vote against the reorganisation plan and there is no quorum for the acceptance of the reor-
ganisation plan. According to §24 of the RA (Subsection 4), if creditors are divided into groups on the basis 
of a reorganisation plan, the plan shall be accepted if, for each group, at least half of the creditors belong-
ing to that group vote in favour of the reorganisation plan and at least two thirds of all votes represented 
in the group are cast in favour of it. If the formation of groups does not correspond to the creditors’ rights 
and interests, creditors will vote against the acceptance of a reorganisation plan; therefore, with the plan 
proposed not adopted, the reorganisation proceedings fail. Consequently, the debtor in such cases shall fi le 
a bankruptcy petition because of having no opportunity to overcome the economic diffi culties by means of 
reorganisation proceedings.
To safeguard the parties’ interests and ensure the legality of the voting in the proceedings, it has been 
prescribed that creditors who have the same rights and interests should vote in a different group from those 
with a different general set of rights and interests. The International Working Group on European Insol-
vency Law has set forth principles of European insolvency law according to which the persons affected by a 
reorganisation plan should vote in separate categories.*5 Several international organisations have also given 
instructions about dividing creditors into distinct groups for voting purposes. The principles and guidelines 
of the World Bank*6 and UNCITRAL*7 prescribe that the law should provide regulations on the formation of 
creditor groups. Furthermore, in a number of countries that have a long-standing tradition of reorganisa-
tion proceedings it is compulsory to cluster creditors into groups (examples are the United States, Germany, 
and Finland).
In current Estonian practice, debtors rarely form creditor groups for voting purposes in such a way as 
would be consistent with the creditors’ rights and interests. Doing so, however, would ensure equal treat-
ment for the creditors while also protecting the interests and rights of the debtor. Accordingly, creditors 
would be interested in voting and in the adoption of a reorganisation plan, which means that the enterprise 
seeking restructuring could continue its economic activity.
The main problem of Estonian law as it currently stands seems to be, in fact, that the law does not pro-
vide clear rules about forming of creditor groups. Therefore, the issue arises of whether the law provides 
suffi cient protection to the parties to reorganisation proceedings. The question is this: should the law pro-
vide for formation of separate creditor groups for voting purposes in order to ensure the protection of the 
parties’ rights and interests? There is a second question too: which creditors should be defi ned as forming 
a separate group for voting purposes in reorganisation proceedings?
4 CCSCr 9.5.2011, 3-2-1-25-11, para. 40. Available at http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-2-1-25-11 (most recently 
accessed on 5.1.2014) (in Estonian).
5 B. Wessels. Principles of European Insolvency Law. Vrije University Amsterdam, p. 7. Available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/
component/jdownloads/fi nish/39/405.html (most recently accessed on 5.1.2014).
6 The World Bank. Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems. April 2001, p. 11. Available 
at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ipg_eng.pdf (most recently accessed on 5.1.2014).
7 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, pp. 262–263, 
275. Available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (most recently accessed on 
26.1.2014).
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2. The objective in the formation of creditor groups 
and legislation in other countries
Reorganisation proceedings are categorised as a type of collective insolvency proceedings. This means that, 
as in bankruptcy proceedings, the principle of equal treatment of creditors applies.*8 It has been held in 
the legal literature that the notion of equality of creditors is understood today as referring to procedural 
equality.*9 In this view, each creditor should have the same opportunity to participate in reorganisation 
proceedings. This principle is relevant for several aspects of the proceedings, including the voting process. 
However, it has been declared, not all creditors have to be treated identically.*10 In fact, creditors who dif-
fer in their rights and interests should not vote in the same group. No matter the wish to treat all creditors 
equally, full applicability of the above-mentioned principle has been deemed impossible in the literature.*11 
It has been held that deviations are caused by various historical, political, and pragmatic factors, among 
them the desire to ensure legal certainty and profi tability of the debtor’s activities.*12 One of the important 
deviations would be the following: pledgees and debtor-related persons would vote in different groups rela-
tive to other creditors. Deviations from the above-mentioned principle have been caused by the fact that 
pledgees and debtor-related persons differ in their rights and interests from other creditors. The formation 
of groups of the mentioned creditors avoids potential confl icts of interest among the creditors. It ensures 
the fair treatment of creditors and the legitimacy of the voting. Moreover, creditors with the same rights are 
treated equally within the separate group.
Secured creditors and unsecured creditors have different rights and interests. Claims of secured credi-
tors are secured by the pledge, which means that their claim is preferred over all other claims with respect 
to a pledged property. Therefore, the interests of the pledgee are associated in particular with whether 
the reorganisation measures affect the pledge. If the plan through its reorganisation measures affects the 
pledged property, the pledgee has a preferential right to the property. If all creditors vote in the same group, 
a situation may arise wherein unsecured creditors make decisions about pledged property that violate the 
principle of the strong position of the pledgee. On the other hand, when the plan does not affect the pledged 
property but secured creditors nonetheless have the right to vote, the interests of unsecured creditors are 
eroded. Secured creditors usually have the majority of votes, but if they are not interested in voting, the 
necessary quorum will not be reached for acceptance of the plan, even when the plan may be consistent 
with the interests of other creditors. It has been held in the legal literature, that voting in different creditor 
groups ensures that creditors cannot prevent the reorganisation plan.*13 With distinct groups, it has also 
been declared, that it will be easier to achieve consensus for the acceptance of the plan.*14 In light of situ-
ations of this nature, secured creditors should be voting in their own groups, for their rights and interests 
differ from the rights and interests of unsecured creditors.
At the same time, debtor-related creditors and other creditors voting in the same group may display a 
confl ict of interests. In some cases, debtor-related creditors shall be given preference in the proceedings and 
thereby have an advantage over other creditors. Debtor-related creditors have readier access to fi nancial 
reports that provide more information than is otherwise available about the debtor’s actual economic situ-
ation, even though it has been pointed out that all creditors in the proceedings should be guaranteed the 
same information about the debtor’s assets and obligations.*15 Compared to other creditors, debtor-related 
8 P. Varul. Pankrotiseaduse uued parandusettepanekud [‘New proposals for amendments to the Bankruptcy Act’]. – Juridica 
2008/6, p. 362 (in Estonian).
9 T. Saarma. Pankrotimenetluse põhimõtted [‘The principles of bankruptcy law’]. – Juridica 2008/6, p. 354 (in Estonian).
10 UNCITRAL. Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (see Note 7), p. 11.
11 T. Saarma (see Note 9), p. 355.
12 A. Kasak. Võlausaldajate võrdse kohtlemise põhimõttest kõrvalekaldumine pankrotimenetluses [‘Deviations from the Prin-
ciple of Equal Treatment of Creditors in Insolvency Proceedings’]. Master’s thesis. Tartu 2010, p. 16 (in Estonian).
13 European Commission. Best Project on Restructuring, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start. Final Report of the Expert Group. 
September 2003. European Commission Enterprise Directorate General, p 52. Available at http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.
de/daten/edz-h/gdb/03/best-report-en.pdf (most recently accessed on 5.1.2014).
14 Saneerimisseaduse eelnõu seletuskiri [‘Explanatory Notes to the Reorganisation Act’], p. 30. Available at http://www.riigi-
kogu.ee/?page=eelnou&op=ems2&emshelp=true&eid=401582&u=20130407192528 (most recently accessed on 5.1.2014) 
(in Estonian).
15 B. Wessels. Cross-Border Insolvency Law: International Instruments and Commentary. Kluwer Law International 2007, 
p. 649.
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creditors have a different position. For example, they have a preferential right to important information. 
This might result in a situation wherein debtor-related creditors decide the conditions for transforming of 
other creditors’ claims. Consequently, creditors should vote in separate groups because of this preferential 
position—since the treatment of creditors varies along these lines, debtor-related creditors should vote in 
different groups than other creditors are.
However, the formation of groups cannot take into account only the interests of creditors. After all, 
the objective of reorganisation is to enable debtors to overcome their economic diffi culties. The debtor 
may form groups in such a way that the creditors would be likely to accept the plan. The Supreme Court 
stated in its ruling in case 3-2-1-122-09 that the interests of the debtor are somewhat more important 
in  reorganisation proceedings than the interests of the creditors. The determinative factor is whether the 
creditors’ interests are seriously infringed.*16
The Supreme Court’s statements regarding preference for the debtor’s interests are reasonable. While 
it must be ensured at the same time that none of the creditors’ interests are seriously violated, when, on the 
other hand, creditors do not take account of the debtor’s interests, reorganisation is unsuccessful and the 
debtor ends up insolvent. Creditors may not be able to recover such large claims in bankruptcy proceedings 
as in reorganisation (especially in a situation wherein the debtor’s only asset is pledged property). Accord-
ing to some studies, payments to creditors may be almost twice as large in reorganisation proceedings as 
in the case of sale in bankruptcy.*17 While the payments tend to be larger, the debtor should still take into 
account the interests of the creditors in the various creditor groups, since it is their voting rights that allow 
the reorganisation to succeed.
The RA’s conception of the idea of dividing creditors into groups proceeds from Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code.*18 According to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code*19, a plan may place a claim in a particular 
group only if that claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests in the relevant 
group. This means that the formation should be based on the claims’ nature. In the U.S. a claim shall be 
included in the group in question where the other claims covered by that group are substantially similar to 
it.*20
Other countries’ legislation on the formation of creditor groups makes it compulsory to divide credi-
tors into distinct groups for reorganisation proceedings. This is seen, for example, in German and Finnish 
insolvency law.
Pursuant to §222 (1) of the German Insolvenzordnung*21 (InsO), in determination of the rights held by 
the parties involved with the insolvency plan, such creditor groups must be formed when the creditors differ 
in their legal statuses. A distinction shall be made among 1) those creditors entitled to separate satisfaction 
if their rights are encroached upon by the plan, 2) the non-lower-ranking creditors, and 3) each class of 
lower-ranking creditors involved in the insolvency proceedings unless their claims are deemed to be waived 
pursuant to §225. Additionally, creditors’ economic interests should be taken into consideration in the 
formation of groups. Pursuant to Subsection 2 of the InsO’s §222, creditors whose economic interests are 
similar shall be assigned to the same group. Obviously, regulation taking into account both the legal and the 
economic interests of the creditors in the forming of creditor groups ensures the protection of the creditors’ 
interests more than does our own legal system, which does not make the formation of groups compulsory.
The Finnish Restructuring of Enterprises Act*22 too (in §51 (3)) provides that creditors shall be divided 
into groups. That law prescribes that distinctions shall be drawn among secured creditors, creditors holding 
a fl oating charge as security for their claims, and other than secured creditors—so that one group is formed 
of creditors whose claims may be enforced without a judgement or court order.
16 CCSCr 18.11.2009, 3-2-1-122-09, para. 19. Available at http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-2-1-122-09 (most 
recently accessed on 5.1.2014) (in Estonian).
17 P. Manavald. Economic crisis and the effectiveness of insolvency regulation. – Juridica International 2010 (XVII), p. 213.
18 Saneerimisseaduse eelnõu seletuskiri (see Note 14), p. 30.
19 USA Bankruptcy Code. Title 11 – Bankruptcy. Available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/usc_sup_01_11.html (most 
recently accessed on 5.1.2014).
20 Bankruptcy Code, Rules and Offi cial Forms, 1992: Law School Edition. West Publishing Co. 1992, p. 328.
21 Insolvenzordnung vom 5. Oktober 1994. – BGBl. I, p. 2866 (in German).
22 ‘Laki yrityksen saneerauksesta’, 1993/47. Available at http://www.fi nlex.fi /en/laki/kaannokset/1993/en19930047 (most 
recently accessed on 23.5.2014). 
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It should be compulsory, in light of the examples given above, to form separate creditor groups in reor-
ganisation proceedings for grouping of those who have different rights and interests for voting purposes. 
Therefore, Estonian reorganisation proceedings’ regulation should be amended on the basis of other coun-
tries’ legislation and guidelines of international organisations mentioned above. The law should provide 
that the debtor is obliged to defi ne separate creditor groups for voting purposes. These groups should be 
formed in such a way that creditors with the same rights and interests would vote in the same group. For 
reduction of any further damage to creditors’ interests, the creditors’ common economic interests should 
also be taken into consideration. The RA should provide minimum requirements stating which creditors 
should be in different groups from each other. At least, there should be an obligation to form separate 
groups at least for secured and unsecured creditors, along with a group only for debtor-related creditors. 
The formation of groups increases legal certainty while at the same time ensuring the legitimacy of the vot-
ing and the protection of the parties’ interests and rights in the reorganisation proceedings. This, in turn, 
leads to a situation wherein creditors will participate actively in the proceedings and the RA accomplishes 
its objective effi ciently.
3. Creditors to be defi ned as a separate group
3.1. Secured creditors
Secured creditors have priorities established by the law in consideration of the nature and purpose of the 
pledge. According to §280 of the Law of Property Act*23 (LPA), secured creditors’ claims are preferred above 
all other claims with respect to the pledged property. Reorganisation proceedings and the voting process 
shall also follow these priorities of secured creditors. However, under current implementing law, secured 
creditors’ rights are not preferential in the manner required by this law.
Firstly, it must be recognised that the RA does not forbid the transformation of a secured claim as a 
reorganisation measure. Secured creditors can be involved in reorganisation and given the right to vote. 
However, according to rulings by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, creditors involved in the reor-
ganisation process cannot be left without their secured claim, where one exists. Secured rights shall not be 
transformed or changed. Since a mortgage does not presume the existence of a claim to be secured (LPA, 
§325 (4)), the claim secured on the transformation does not affect the validity of a mortgage.*24 However, 
as the Supreme Court has stated, reorganisation proceedings cannot treat secured creditors with much less 
favour than that given them in bankruptcy proceedings.*25
Nevertheless, secured creditors are treated in reorganisation as unsecured creditors, and they are in 
the same group as unsecured creditors for voting purposes. Such a regulatory approach harms the rights 
and interests of the secured creditors because they are not treated as priorities; in contrast, in bankruptcy 
proceedings, their preferential rights are ensured. According to §153 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act*26 (BA), 
secured creditors’ claims are satisfi ed before all other claims. The RA does not specify such priority rights. 
Therefore, a situation arises in which secured creditors prefer bankruptcy proceedings to reorganisation, 
while the former are, in general, less favourable to the interests of unsecured creditors.
Moreover, it has been held that the parties’ divergent interests mean that secured creditors almost 
always prefer quick sale of their security, while unsecured creditors prefer the amount realised for the sale 
of assets or the business.*27 If the property is sold for as high a price as possible, unsecured creditors too can 
have their claims satisfi ed. In the case of a quick sale, the price is lower and only secured creditors may have 
their claim satisfi ed. In consequence, secured creditors have another reason to prefer the debtor’s liquida-
tion to reorganisation, for in liquidation they can rapidly recover most or all of their investment. There may 
be advantages for secured creditors if the debtor is declared bankrupt. It has been pointed out that banks 
23 Asjaõigusseadus. – RT I 1993, 39, 590; RT I, 23.4.2012, 1 (in Estonian). 
24 CCSCr 9.5.2011, 3-2-1-25-11, para. 59; CCSCr 19.6.2013, 3-2-1-74-13, para. 18. Available at http://www.riigikohus.
ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-2-1-74-13 (most recently accessed on 5.1.2014) (in Estonian).
25 CCSCr 9.5.2011, 3-2-1-25-11, para. 61; CCSCr 19.6.2013, 3-2-1-74-13, para. 19.
26 Pankrotiseadus. – RT I 2003, 17, 95; RT I, 23.12.2013, 1 (in Estonian).
27 The World Bank. Effective Insolvency Systems: Principles and Guidelines. October 2000, p. 22. Available at http://www1.
worldbank.org/fi nance/assets/images/DL_2_2_consultation.pdf (most recently accessed on 14.5.2014).
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and similar lenders often may be able to recover a greater percentage of their claim if the debtor is liquidat-
ed.*28 Reorganisation may delay realising the security of secured creditors.*29
As is noted above, many other countries’ legal acts and also international organisations provide that 
secured creditors shall be divided into groups for voting purposes. For instance, the German InsO (§222 (1)) 
and the Finnish Restructuring of Enterprises Act (§51 (3)) prescribe that secured creditors shall be divided 
into separate groups.
Accordingly, if a secured creditor’s claim is not fully secured, the unsecured part of the claim shall not 
be treated as a secured claim. Among the guidelines for distinguishing between creditors with different 
rights are those provided by UNCITRAL: If the value of the secured property is not suffi cient to satisfy the 
secured creditor, the secured creditor shall participate in the proceedings as an unsecured creditor.*30 The 
creditor has a preferential right only with respect to the portion of the claim that is secured. The unsecured 
part can be treated in the same way as other unsecured claims because there is no preferential right. For 
avoidance of unnecessary court actions, this principle should be set forth clearly in the RA.
In bankruptcy proceedings, compromise refers to an agreement that is similar to that in reorganisation 
wherein the debtor and creditors reach a compromise with respect to the payment of debts (BA, §178 (1)). 
Compromise in bankruptcy proceedings calls into play special regulation for secured creditors for voting 
purposes. According to §181 of the BA, a creditor whose claim is secured by a pledge shall vote on a com-
promise only if the claim is not fully secured by the pledge. In such a case, the claim of the pledgee shall be 
taken into account in voting only to the extent that the claim would presumably not be satisfi ed from the 
proceeds of the sale of the pledged object. If there is a request for the invocation of a claim arising from the 
right of security of a creditor who is the pledgee to be precluded for more than 90 days by a compromise 
proposal, the claim of the creditor who is the pledgee shall be fully taken into account in the voting.
Both the nature and the purpose are similar between reorganisation and bankruptcy proceedings. It 
cannot be the legislator’s will for secured creditors’ interests to be protected less in reorganisation than in 
bankruptcy proceedings. Such a situation cannot be justifi ed. The position of the pledgee in reorganisation 
proceedings needs to be strengthened. For better protection of the secured creditors’ rights in the proceed-
ings to be ensured, forming a separate group of secured creditors should be considered.
3.2. Debtor-related creditors
Debtors should arrange a different group for related creditors for voting purposes in reorganisation pro-
ceedings because, when compared to other creditors, these creditors have different rights and interests. 
However, the RA does not differentiate between creditors who are related to debtors and other creditors. 
According to UNCITRAL, a debtor-related person may be i) a person who is or has been in a position of 
control of the debtor or ii) a parent, subsidiary, partner, or affi liate of the debtor.*31 The Estonian insolvency 
system does not provide general regulation and case law stating what the legal status of debtor-related 
persons should be. In defi nition of the class of debtor-related creditors, therefore, §117 of the BA should be 
followed. It provides a list of persons connected with natural and legal persons. However, that list is not 
exhaustive—in Subsection 3 of the same section, the BA states that a court may consider a person who is 
close to a debtor to be a debtor-related person even if that person is not specifi ed in Subsection 1 or 2.
A clear distinction should be made between ordinary and subordinated creditor claims. As has been 
noted in the legal literature, a subordinated loan is usually defi ned as a loan that is repayable after the 
claims of all other creditors have been covered.*32 It is the opinion of the Ministry of Justice that the sta-
tus of partners/shareholders or other debtor-related persons differs from that of other creditors. On the 
basis of economic content, their loan should be treated as increasing the share capital. Therefore, the loan 
cannot be treated as commensurate with other claims in reorganisation and bankruptcy proceedings. 
The claim shall be satisfi ed only after all other creditors’ claims have been covered. Treating the claims 
28 J. Sarra. Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations. Canada: University of Toronto Press 
Incorporated 2003, p. 59.
29 Ibid., p. 58.
30 UNCITRAL. Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (see Note 7), p. 275.
31 Ibid., p. 6.
32 A.Vutt. Subordination of shareholder loans in Estonian law. – Juridica International 2008 (XV), p. 87. 
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equally may constitute an abuse of the other creditors’ rights, and it reduces the ‘ordinary’ creditors’ trust 
in  reorganisation.*33
Section 222 of the German InsO prescribes that the formation of different group for subordinated credi-
tors must be addressed in an insolvency plan. The interests of subordinated creditors (nachrangige Insol-
venzgläubiger) are to be addressed after all unsecured creditors have been paid in full. Subsection 3 of that 
section states exceptions to this requirement—a separate group may be formed for minor shareholders 
whose share in the liable capital amounts to less than one per cent or to less than one 1,000 euros.
On the other hand, the debtor can ensure the acceptance of the reorganisation plan through debtor-related 
persons. In the event of approval of the reorganisation plan, the debtor has an opportunity to continue its 
business activities, and its partners/shareholders are more likely to earn some money. If the creditor groups 
are formed in that way, the creditors largely support the approval of the plan, and then there is less chance 
of the plan not being accepted. Among the results is that the creditors and the debtor attempt to increase the 
number of their votes, in order to control the reorganisation process as has been declared in the literature.*34
Debtor-related persons and other creditors voting in the same group may act against the principle of 
good faith. The principle of good faith is prescribed in §138 of the General Part of the Civil Code Act*35 and 
in §6 of the Law of Obligations Act*36 (LOA). According to the former (in §138(1)), rights shall be exercised 
and obligations performed in good faith. The act goes on to prescribe, in Subsection 2, that a right shall not 
be exercised in an unlawful manner or with the objective of causing damage to another person. According 
to the legal literature, for purposes of ascertaining whether the rights in question have been abused, the 
parties’ behaviour should be evaluated for whether it is fair and equitable.*37
Therefore, a situation may be created wherein debtor-related creditors participate in the proceedings 
and abuse their rights in order to obtain control over the proceedings. Creditors may submit a claim that 
is void because of the ostensible transaction. Furthermore, money can be taken out with these claims and 
other creditors’ interests may be harmed. However, according to §200 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure*38 
(CCP), participants in proceedings are required to exercise their procedural rights in good faith.
In Estonian judicial practice, disputes have arisen with respect to debtor-related persons participating 
in voting. The practice, regrettably, has not been uniform.
The Supreme Court found in its ruling on case 3-2-1-122-09 that the RA does not distinguish between 
debtor-related creditors and other creditors. Under the RA (§24 (2)), the number of votes for each creditor 
is proportional to the amount of the creditor’s principal claim, which shall have been ascertained pursu-
ant to said legal act. According to the court, the BA similarly does not distinguish between debtor-related 
creditors and other creditors.*39 However, neither this silence nor the above statement can be a reason that 
debtor-related and other creditors should vote in the same group in both reorganisation and bankruptcy 
proceedings.
Pärnu County Court approved a reorganisation plan in its decision 2-09-21196. In this case, the bank 
as a secured creditor submitted an application to a court in which it was requested that approval of the 
reorganisation plan be refused because, on the basis of the reorganisation plan, the bank would be treated 
substantially less favourably than were other creditors, who were related to the debtor. The bank was of the 
opinion that it would not be acceptable if the debtor-related creditors, who held two-thirds of all the votes 
represented, were to decide on the transformation of the secured creditor’s claim. The court criticised the 
bank, noting that the creditor’s action was the reason for which the debtor had had to submit the reorgan-
isation petition in the fi rst place. The County Court found that, since reorganisation and bankruptcy pro-
ceedings have different objectives, relatedness in the case of some debtor-related persons has no legal effect 
and that, unlike in bankruptcy proceedings, relatedness does not mean that violation of other creditors’ 
rights should automatically be presumed.*40
33 Saneerimisseaduse muutmise seaduse eelnõu väljatöötamiskavatsuse esitamine kooskõlastamiseks (see Note 2), p. 3. 
34 J. Sarra (see Note 28), pp. 221–222. 
35 Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus. – RT I 2002, 35, 216; RT I, 6.12.2010, 1 (in Estonian). 
36 Võlaõigusseadus. – RT I 2001, 81, 487; RT I, 29.11.2013, 1 (in Estonian). 
37 I. Kull. Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne [‘General Part of the Civil Code Act, Commented Edi-
tion’]. Tallinn 2010, p. 419 (in Estonian). 
38 Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik. – RT I 2005, 26,197; RT I, 6.2.2014, 13 (in Estonian). 
39 CCSCr 18.11.2009, 3-2-1-122-09, para. 18.
40 Ruling of Pärnu County Court 2-09-21196 (in Estonian).
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Harju County Court found in its ruling on case 2-09-12156 that debtor-related creditors shall be sepa-
rated out into their own group. The court analysed the principle related to equal treatment of creditors and 
found the following: a situation in which there are secured and unsecured creditors as well as debtor-related 
creditors and they are not divided into separate groups even though the measures of debt transactions are 
different runs counter to the purpose of reorganisation, since the creditors have different rights. The court 
found that debtor-related creditors should belong to a separate group from other creditors and that the 
votes of the debtor-related persons cannot be the determining factor in the transformation of other credi-
tors’ claims. The court noted that the purpose of the creditor groups is to ensure that creditors with the same 
interests and rights are treated equally. Debtor-related persons clearly have the same interests in general, 
which distinguish them from other creditors.*41
Although the legislator has prescribed legal remedies for creditors, the practice is not uniform and does 
not always take into account the objective of the formation of creditor groups. According to §16 (2) of the 
RA, the duty of a reorganisation adviser, inter alia, is to verify the lawfulness of creditors’ claims. Section 
43 prescribes, in Subsection 1, that the court terminates reorganisation proceedings under the following 
conditions: it becomes evident that there is actually no claim against the debtor for which transformation 
is requested by a reorganisation plan, the amount of the claim is unclear, the reorganisation adviser cannot 
determine the lawfulness of the claim, or the claim is not substantiated. Furthermore, creditors may fi le an 
application to raise an objection pertaining to the approval of the reorganisation plan. According to §26 of 
the RA, a creditor may, within the term specifi ed in the same act’s §10 (2) 3), submit a reasoned application 
to a court in which he or she requests that approval of the reorganisation plan be refused if 1) he or she has 
voted against the reorganisation plan; 2) his or her rights have been seriously violated in the course of the 
preparation of the reorganisation plan or in the plan’s acceptance; or 3) on the basis of the reorganisation 
plan, he or she is treated substantially less favourably than other creditors or relative to other creditors 
belonging to his or her group.
However, the provisions do not protect the parties’ rights and interests suffi ciently. Instead, these 
claims might lead to court actions and, therefore, may not ensure safeguarding of the principle of speed and 
effi ciency of the proceedings.*42 Consequently, the legislator should amend the law and make the forma-
tion of creditor groups mandatory. In order to ensure the legitimacy of the voting and also guarantee legal 
certainty and legal clarity, debtor-related persons should be voting in different groups from other creditors.
On the other hand, it is not always justifi ed to form separate groups of debtor-related creditors when 
their transactions are real and legitimate. Therefore, in each case, the relationship between the parties and 
the economic substance of the transaction should be verifi ed. If the transaction does not go against the 
principle of good faith and equal treatment of creditors, and the debtor has had consideration, there is no 
reason to form a separate group. In this case too, the principle of forming a separate group of creditors with 
the same rights is also followed. It is when there are subordinated claims and other debtor-related creditor 
claims not involving the same legal status and interests as the other unsecured claims that a separate group 
from other creditors should be created.
4. Conclusions
The issue of formation of creditor groups for voting purposes arises in relation to the adoption of a reorgan-
isation plan. Reorganisation is a set of measures implemented in order to enable the debtor to overcome the 
economic diffi culties experienced. Since the debtor’s reorganisation plan is of determinative importance for 
the further economic activity of said business, the debtor might manipulate the votes and affect the adop-
tion of the plan, which could violate creditors‘ rights and interests. In order to ensure the legality of the vot-
ing, it is justifi ed to set up groups of creditor where those in each group have different rights and interests 
from those in the others.
In a comparison to the legislation of other states discussed in this article, the Estonian reorganisation 
law is one of the few national laws in its sphere that do not provide clear regulations on the formation of 
41 Ruling of Harju County Court 2-09-12156 (in Estonian).
42 M. Schihalejev. Häälte määramine ja selle kohtulik järelevalve maksejõuetusmenetluses [‘Determination of Votes and Its 
Supervision Exercised by Courts in Insolvency Proceedings’], pp. 29–33. Master’s thesis. Tartu 2013 (in Estonian).
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separate creditor groups and do not generate associated judicial practice. However, the formation of differ-
ent creditor groups is essential if the legislator is to ensure legal certainty and an effective reorganisation 
law. Examination of the practice of other states as discussed above reveals no evidence that forming groups 
is not justifi ed. On the contrary, all of the states considered prescribe that formation of creditor groups is 
compulsory when the creditors have disparate rights and interests, in order to ensure the equal treatment 
of those creditors with the same legal status. Therefore, there is justifi cation for the opinions expressed by 
the Estonian Ministry of Justice in its Submission for Approval of the Plan of Developing the Draft Act on 
Amending the Reorganisation Act about amendments to the RA.
The legislator should prescribe clear rules and provisions in the RA stating that the debtor should form 
creditor groups for voting purposes in reorganisation proceedings when the creditors differ in their legal 
status and economic interests. The RA should provide minimum requirements that determine which credi-
tors should be voting in their own groups. Secured and unsecured creditors should be assigned to different 
groups. However, a creditor has a preferential right only to the extent to which the claim is secured. Debtor-
related creditors too should vote in a separate group, especially in the case of subordinated claims. In cases 
involving other debtor-related creditors’ claims, verifi cation should be obtained in each case as to whether 
they have the same legal status and interests as the other unsecured creditors, such as would justify voting 
in the same group as those others.
